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COMMENTS
Juries and Jurors: Juries on Trial: Constitutional Right
Versus Judicial Burden: An Analysis of Jury Effective-
ness and Alternative Methods for Deciding Cases
L Introduction
The Framers of the Constitution essentially had two choices with respect to
deciding on the method of dispute resolution. First, they could have chosen a
non-jury method, in which a great deal of power would be left to one person, the
judge. Second, they could have selected a jury to decide the case. As the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments evidence, the Framers chose the latter of the two
propositions. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury."' The Seventh Amendment addresses civil suits, by
adding that "[imn suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."' Now, after
two hundred years, we are left to ask ourselves why they made the decision they
did. Furthermore, is the reasoning and rationale advanced by our forefathers still
valid today?
At the time of its conception, the right to trial by jury was meant to prohibit
a large concentration of power in the hands of one person? This was to be
accomplished by distributing the power of adjudication to many people.4 The
spreading of power was thought to insure a fair trial by a jury of one's peers.
With this historical backdrop in mind, let us skip ahead a couple hundred years
to 1987 and examine an actual trial by jury.
In June 1987, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Tanner v. United
States.' The defendants in Tanner had been convicted of conspiring to defraud
1. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.").
3. The strong pro-jury feelings can be seen even as early as 1775 when the colonists listed jury trials
as one of their reasons for taking up arms in the "Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up
Arms." The colonists claimed they had been deprived "of the accustomed and inestimable privilege of
trial by jury, in cases affecting both life and property." LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS,
PALLADIUI OF LIBERTY 99 (2d ed. 1988).
4. The number of members on a jury at the time the Constitution was adopted was clearly twelve.
Depending on the political jurisdiction and the function of the jury in a given situation, juries of other
sizes have been used. See id. at 145.
5. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
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the United States and committing various acts of mail fraud.6 However, of
interest was not so much the acts of the defendants, but rather those of the jurors.
As one of the trial jurors stated, several jurors had consistently been consuming
alcohol at lunch throughout the trial.7 Not surprisingly, the jurors fell asleep
during the afternoons. Another juror submitted an affidavit which alleged
widespread use of drugs among the jurors as well.'
The Court solved this dispute by refusing to do anything. A jury of drug-
abusing peers is apparently isolated from any inconveniences, such as evidentiary
hearings which probe illegal drug use during a fair trial.9 As the Supreme Court
held, "testimony of juror alcohol and drug use during criminal trial was barred by
rule of evidence,"'0 and "substance abuse does not constitute 'improper outside
influence' about which jurors may testify under rule of evidence."" Thus, the
Supreme Court sustained the defendants' convictions, by a jury of their peers.
Obviously, the Framers of the Constitution did not have this sort of judicial
travesty in mind when crafting the Bill of Rights. It is fair to presume that had
our forefathers believed they were developing a system in which something like
Tanner could take place, they would have taken necessary precautions to prevent
it.
This comment will focus on the inherent flaws within the jury system as it now
stands. However, it is not intended to insinuate that such abuses are common to
every case, but rather that they are widespread enough to be considered a major
problem. Furthermore, the comment will examine steps that have been taken, and
additional steps which should be taken, in an effort to cure these jury-trial
maladies. Finally, the antithesis of jury trials, the nonjury trial, will be examined
as an alternative to our present system.
II. From the "Deciding Faction" to the "Deciding Factor": A Flawed System
Not long ago, the right to trial by jury was held to be so "justly dear to the
American people,"" that regardless of "whether guaranteed by the Constitution
or provided by statute, it should be jealously guarded by the courts." 4 That is
no longer the case. From peremptory challenges" to discrimination,' jury selec-
tion 7 to juror avoidance, 8 juries have become a method of creative lawyer
6. Id. at 112-13.
7. Id. at 113.
8. Id. at 115-16.
9. Id. at 127.
10. Id. at 125.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 134 (affirming in part and remanding).
13. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (I Pet.) 433, 445 (1830).
14. The constitutional right to jury trial is to be secured upon compliance with laws reasonably
calculated to enforce thc guaranty in accordance with recognized principles of jurisprudence, State ex
reL Kennedy v. District Ct., 194 P.2d 256, 260 (Mont. 1948).
15. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text




manipulation to achieve a desired result, perhaps completely inconsistent with the
case itself. Furthermore, add to the equation costs, 9 complexities," time con-
sumption,2" and outside media influence,22 and it becomes difficult not to think
the jury trial has outlived its use.
An analysis of these enumerated factors, along with a host of others, will
demonstrate that the trend within the judicial branch has been to gradually usurp
juries of their power, while increasing the role of the judge. Not surprisingly, this
shift in power has occurred as the horror stories increase regarding the actions of
jurors. However, the greater role of the judge and diminishing power of the juries
may not be enough to cure these present day judicial problems.
Theoretically, the constitutional right to trial by jury was meant to insure a
right to a fair and impartial jury' drawn from a cross-section of the communi-
ty;24 however, this seemingly luck of the draw system is anything but random.
In effect, jury selection has become a process whereby both the judge and lawyers
battle to assemble the twelve people most likely to support their own beliefs. This
process may not only distort justice, but is also costly and time consuming as
well.
A. Exorbitant Time Consumption
Jury selection begins with the process known as voir dire.' Theoretically, voir
dire is used to determine the state of the jurors' minds so that a fair and impartial
jury can be chosen.26 Unfortunately, this seemingly simple process may in reality
last a great deal of time. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,27 the voir
dire lasted over six weeks.' Furthermore, counsel indicated that it was not
unknown for jury selection to take six months.29
Why does voir dire consume so much time? The main explanation is that while
voir dire is in theory supposed to yield a fair and impartial jury, lawyers have a
much different agenda. On the contrary, voir dire gives counsel the opportunity
to produce the most partial and biased jury it can possibly muster. Lawyers use
voir dire to establish a rapport with the jurors, preview their case, and acquaint
the jurors with the applicable principles of the law which is most consistent with
18. See infra note 55-61 and accompanying text
19. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text
20. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text
21. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text
22. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text
23. Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 211 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Mo. 1948).
24. People v. Tamble, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
25. "Voir Dire" means literally, "[tlo speak the truth." This phrase denotes the preliminary
examination which the court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification
and suitability to serve as jurors. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See JAMEs J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE
OF SELECTING A JURY 324 (2d ed. 1990).
27. 446 U.S. 501 (1984).
28. Id. at 503.
29. Id.
1995]
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their case.3" While obviously biased jurors will be excused, a problem remains.
Skilled lawyers will still seek to fill the jury with those likely to side with their
client, based on reasons which are~not so obvious that the court mandates the
particular juror's excusal.
B. Stacking Parts of the Jury
Opposing counsel will seldom allow a lawyer to stack the jury with people who
favor his position. However, a lawyer need not stack the entire jury in order to
assure victory befo-e the trial has even commenced. Research indicates that on
most juries, the three most active jurors, or a quarter of the jury, account for over
one-half of all juror statements during deliberations." Accordingly, a lawyer's
final argument will concentrate on those select individuals who will assume
leadership roles in the jury room.32
Often times, lawyers will rely on jury consultants for aid in determining who
to select for jury duty. Jury consultants are typically former or practicing lawyers
with social science backgrounds.3 A well-trained jury consultant can effectively
help the attorney by profiling ideal jurors, investigating the jury list, and
predicting a jury's response to the case.34
Determining which jurors are likely to side with a given attorney is evidently
not too difficult a task. Validation studies using empirical approaches have
produced positive hit rates in the range of 70%-90% accuracy in detecting
committed jurors, while using as few as ten to twelve juror characteristics."
Further, the way ir which the system for profiling jurors is constructed has a
great deal to do with the likelihood that the scientific approach to jury selection
will indeed be more effective than intuition or chance. 6
An example of a jury consultant's effectiveness occurred in the high profile
Florida State trial of William Kennedy Smith. Smith stood accused of raping a
young woman. However, Smith's attorneys retained a jury consultant whose
30. See GOBERT, supra note 26, at 320.
31. See John A. Call, Psychology in Litigation, TRIAL, Mar. 1985, at 48, 50.
32. High status, well educated persons are often looked to for leadership. Also, persons who
exercise supervisory autfority at work or who hold elected positions are likely to be leaders; they are
used to directing others and will probably continue to do so in the jury room. See GOBERT, supra note
26, at 451.
33. See BILL COLSON ET AL., JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE ch. 6, at 5 (1994).
34. Other functions a jury consultant might provide include observing jurors in court, conducting
community surveys, conducting a mock jury, conducting a shadow jury, preparing the juror questionnaire,
assessing the effect of pretrial publicity, testifying as to the effects of pretrial publicity, criticizing the
attorney in nonverbal conmunication, aiding witnesses in preparing testimony and preparing motions for
the administration of juror surveys. Id.
35. See JAY SCHULMAN Er AL., IN THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM 13 (1987).
36. See Robert D. Minick, Using Jury Consultants to Assist Voir Dire, in FIFTH ANNUAL
LITIGATION MANAGEMEtrr SUPERCOURSE 289 (PLI Litig. & Admin Practice Course Handbook Series




involvement in the trial was described by opposing coutisel as an "instrumental
factor" in the jury's decision to render a not guilty verdict. 7
Federal courts, concerned with these custom-made juries, have begun using
judges, instead of lawyers, to conduct the questioning of prospective jurors in voir
dire." However, even this method is vulnerable to the work of jury consultants.
In the case of Continental Airlines Inc. v. American Airlines Inc.,39 the court was
faced with an issue concerning an antitrust action involving three major airlines.
The judge conducted the questioning during voir dire; however, defense attorneys
compensated by using a jury consultant to analyze jury traits and body lan-
guage." While the potential jurors were telling the judge one thing, their body
language conveyed to the lawyers an entirely different message. Accordingly, the
lawyers were able to analyze the body language of given jurors to decipher which
of the potential jurors would be sympathetic to their side.4 This tactic is
believed to have been a contributing factor to the jury's quick finding that the
airline was not liable for trying to monopolize certain air traffic markets.
4!2
C. The Cross-Section Fairy Tale
Whereas the original English jurors were selected based on their knowledge of
the facts, 3 juries today are selected based on their unmitigated ignorance. Where
once the jury was selected in a straightforward manner- juries were comprised
of those familiar with the facts that gave rise to the dispute" - we now search
for those as completely removed from the facts as possible. Moreover, jurors are
intended to be drawn from a cross-section of the community.4"
However, there are three stages in the jury selection process at which the ideal
of a representative cross-section can be seriously compromised.46 The first is the
master list of eligible jurors from which the selections are made. It follows that
if the list does not represent the community, then neither will the jury.47 Second,
various prospective jurors thus selected are either excused by judges or
disqualified, narrowing the number of eligible jurors even further.4" Lastly,
peremptory challenges (or legalized discrimination) can be used to excuse all or
37. Id.
38. Monday Morning Quarterback: Jury Selection Gives Defense Winning Edge in Antitrust Trial,
INSIDE LrTG., Sept. 1993, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Jury Selection Gives Defense Winning Edge].
39. Nos. G-92-259, G-92-266, 1993 WL 379396, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1993).
40. See Jury Selection Gives Defense Winning Edge, supra note 38, at 4.
41. Id.
42. The primary consultant for assisting American's team, Robert Hirschhorn, stated that the fact
that the jury returned a verdict in a month-long case in only three hours suggests that jury consulting was
valuable in the case. "Especially in federal court," he says,"jury consulting is as essential to a defense
as gas is to a car." Id.
43. See GOBERT, supra note 26, at 145.
44. Id.
45. See Metallic Gold Mining Co. v Watson, 117 P. 609 (Colo. 1911).
46. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 758-59 (Cal. 1978).
47. Id. at 759.
48. Id.
1995]
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most members of certain groups who make up a significant part of the communi-
ty.
49
1. Role of Eligible Juror Candidates
The ultimate object of the jury selection is to bring into court jurors who have
been chosen imperscnally, methodically, and by equal chance.50 Courts attempt
to achieve this result through a variety of different methods. The most frequent
means utilized are voter registrations, driver's licenses, and, in some cases,
property tax roles. However, all of these cases systematically exclude certain
members of the community. When using voter registrations, all those who are not
registered voters ar. automatically excluded. When drawing from drivers'
licenses, the section of the community which does not drive is eliminated.
Finally, the great number who do not own property will never become jurors in
some systems.
Amazingly, in a scheme founded on the idea of drawing from as wide a
selection of people a,; possible, the mode of selecting persons for jury service has
never been regarded as an essential element in the constitutional right of trial by
jury." And while present methods may arguably yield a large selection to choose
from, those methods also systematically preclude a true cross-section from ever
materializing.
In essence, the master list represents the first opportunity for the jury trial to
be stripped of its impersonal, equal chance characteristics. Historically, this can
be illustrated by examining the initial methods used. At common law, the panel
of jurors was-selected by the sheriff from his list of freeholders. However, this
process was attended by abuses, such as the packing of juries. 2
Accordingly, most of the American states have long since taken the selection
of jury lists out of the hands of the sheriff. The responsibility is now generally
given to other officers or bodies, such as jury commissioners, the selectmen of
the towns, town supervisors, and county commissioners.
53
This shift in responsibility raises an interesting issue. A primary argument in
favor of the jury system, and against a non-jury system, is that people are
extremely hesitant to bestow all the power of adjudication to one person, the
judge. Ironically, we do not hesitate to confer similar power to one person, the
individual who selects the list of possible jurors, nor ever bother to question it.
In essence, however, those who control the jury's origin could realistically control
the outcome of the case. The question to be addressed later is why do we
thoroughly distrust our judges, while putting our full faith in jury commissioners,
town selectmen, and town supervisors?
49. Id.
50. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 136 (1964).
51. See People v. Dunn, 52 N.E. 572, 574 (N.Y. 1899)
52. See Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 68 N.W. 53 (Minn. 1896).




As much as some people would like to suppress judicial power, the fact is that
trial judges themselves are beginning to exercise very important parts in the
selection process, particularly in supervising the selection and drawing of
jurors.' This is worthy of mention for two reasons. First, it reemphasizes the
point that more power is being usurped from the people and given to the judges.
Second, if the jurors become nothing more than hand-picked, judicial pawns,
selected to carry out the wishes of the judge, what is the use of having them
around?
2. Excusals and Disqualifications
Once the list of jurors is complete, which in theory represents a cross-section
of the community, otherwise eligible jurors are then systematically eliminated,
either through excusals or disqualification. The system begins with the premise
that the state has an inherent and indisputable right to jury service from its
citizens - such service is one of the general duties and burdens of citizenship.55
However, this general rule is simultaneously undermined by statutory excep-
tions. 6 Often times, the statutes exclude from jury duty lawyers, physicians, and
members of other select professional occupations. 7
Right away, the cross-section of the community has been narrowed. From
there, certain exemptions may be granted by the court, regardless of statutes. A
person may be exempted from jury service based on their religious beliefs. 8
Groups of people may also be excused if attendance would be an extreme
inconvenience or undue hardship. 9 Presumably then, high income earners who
would lose a great deal of money would be excused, as would lower class
workers, who could not afford to live without what little income they might have.
The court concedes this by adding that these excuses are allowable, even if they
result in underrepresentations of certain cognizable groups.'
Disqualifications represent another means whereby the cross-section is whittled
down into a very select group. Generally speaking, the qualifications of jurors are
to be tested by the state constitutional and statutory provisions.6' Accordingly,
each state has the power to establish the qualifications for jurors to serve in its
courts.62 Typically, jurors must be a citizen of the United States and a resident
54. See id.
55. See id. § 90.
56. A statutory exemption is not a vested right. It is a mere gratuity or privilege subject to repeal
at the pleasure of the legislature. See Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
57. Under Federal statutes, members of the Armed Forces, police and fire departments, and members
of the executive, legislative and/or judicial branches, are granted exemptions from jury duty. See 28
U.S.C. § 1862(1)-(3) (1988).
58. United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (D. Wash. 1943) (finding that the refusal of a member
of Jehovah's Witnesses to act as a juror for religious reasons is justifiable under the constitutional
provision forbidding the passage of any law by Congress prohibiting the free exercise of religion).
59. United States v. Armsbury, 408 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Or. 1976).
60. Id.
61. See People v. Mol, 100 N.W. 913 (Mich. 1904).
62. Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949).
1995]
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of the particular county of the trial. They must be between twenty-one and sixty-
five or seventy and in control of their natural faculties. In most cases, they must
be able to read and write English and be of fair character and approved
integrity."'
Two points should be made about the qualifications of jurors. The first is that
the competency to serve is left largely to the sound legal discretion of the trial
judge.' This is another illustration of a judge's ability to craft a jury in whatever
form he desires. Moreover, the judge's rulings on this matter are not subject to
review unless accompanied by some imputed error of law."S In other words, a
judge's decision will not likely be reversed.
Second, although these qualifications provide sound guidelines for jury
selection, they simultaneously reduce the eligible class even further. Thus, to
characterize a jury as being selected from a "cross-section" of the community, as
the Framers fully intended it to be, is absolutely ludicrous. What is more
astonishing is that we are still only dealing with the group of people from which
the jury is selected. The narrowing process becomes even more intensified once
challenges are utilized.
3. Peremptory Challenges
Originally, a peremptory challenge served as a vehicle for lawyers to challenge
certain jurors witlout showing any cause." It was not essential to such a
challenge that any bias or prejudice be shown on the part of a juror.67 Further-
more, the lawyer's right to reject jurors could be exercised without any inquiry
into motives.' Wita such an arbitrary method of dismissing jurors, the question
immediately arises as to whether or not peremptory challenges may in effect be
a legalized means of discrimination. Examining some recent California cases may
provide the answer.
In People v. Superior Court,' the California Superior Court held that a party
may not use peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the
basis of group bias."0 Moreover, in a criminal prosecution, peremptory challenges
based solely on race violate equal protection guarantees when a defendant is a
member of the race being challenged, and a defendant, regardless of race, has
standing to object to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challeiges.7"
To prohibit such violations, the court enumerated a three step process whereby
a defendant may allege an unconstitutional exclusion of some group. First, the
63. See 47 AM. JIUR 2D Jury § 100 (1964).
64. State v. Chavis, 210 S.E.2d 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
65. Id.
66. State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037 (Ariz. 1949).
67. State v. Ward, 167 So. 2d 359 (La. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965).
68. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 235 (1964).
69. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
70. The court defined group bias as a presumption that jurors are biased merely because they are




defendant must make a prima facie showing of some exclusion." Once a prima
facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to demon-
strate a neutral explanation for the challenge."3 Lastly, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving
purposeful discrimination."4
At first glance, this three part test seems to provide a method to eliminate or
at least reduce discrimination caused by peremptory challenges. However, the
nominal impact it will have is made readily apparent when read in light of People
v. Barber,75 another California decision. In Barber, the court held that jury
selection is an inexact science, based as much on hunches and inferences about
human behavior as it is based on hard facts.76 Therefore, peremptory challenges
basically lend themselves to the application of popular psychology, the consider-
ation of unarticulated values, and the varied experiences at trial and in the life of
the attorneys who use them. Thus, a decision to exercise a peremptory
challenge may be based on factors that an appellate court cannot see when
reviewing a cold record."
In other words, although the court cannot glean any explanation from the record
for the exclusion of a juror except for discrimination, such discrimination may be
overcome simply by writing off the exclusion of the juror based on the lawyer's
hunch or inference. In essence then, it will be a very rare case where a lawyer
cannot find some sort of acceptable excuse for excluding certain racial or ethnic
groups."0
A common response to this is because both attorneys have the same opportunity
to use peremptory challenges, these challenges should serve to negate any harmful
impact; however, this proposition is not necessarily true. Consider an example of
a white man accused of rape in New York's Chinatown. From the master list, a
pool of potential jurors composed of all but three Chinese persons is compiled.









80. But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, a black man was indicted in
Kentucky on burglary charges. The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove all four black
venire persons, leaving an all-white jury. In its decision, the Supreme Court announced a new
purposeful discrimination standard, consisting of two steps. First, the defendant had to "establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." Id. at 96. Second, if the prima facie case was
demonstrated, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to "come forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors . . . [but not one rising] to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause." Id. Furthermore, the Court held that the prosecutor could not rebut the defendant's prima facie
case of discrimination by stating merely that he .challenged juror's of the defendant's race on the
assumption - or his intuitive judgement - that they would be partial to the defendant based on their
shared race." Id. at 97.
1995]
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people. Now the defense may use the same peremptory challenges, but only a
very foolish person could argue the defense has the same power as the
prosecution. Regardless of how the defense uses its peremptory power, the jury
will inevitably be composed entirely of Chinese people.
III. Trial By Jury: A Harrowing Prospect For Jurors and Parties Involved
A. Complexity
Once the systematic selection of potential jurors is complete, those chosen
individuals are bestowed with the responsibility of listening to the facts and
arriving at a verdict. Often times, this is more responsibility than they can handle
or should be expected to handle. To the credit of the courts, "complexity" is one
area where courts have taken significant steps to remedy. The rule the courts once
followed was that where the right to a jury trial exists, such a trial cannot be
denied simply because the facts involved in the controversy are beyond the
comprehension of the jury."
In the case of General American Life Ins. Co. v. Carter," the plaintiff brought
an action as beneficiary of his deceased sister's insurance policy against the
defendant, a Missouri corporation, for the wrongful death of his sister." Conced-
ing that the court would be better able than a jury to deal "intelligently" with
matters that are multifarious," the court held that the jury trial should neverthe-
less stand.8"
More recently, however, the courts have moved towards ignoring the inherent
right to jury trial when jurors are proven to be incompetent to decide the
matter. 6 In the case of Re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,87
the court took an entirely different position than its predecessors. In Re Japanese,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants sought to drive American television
producers out of the American market by selling televisions at artificially
depressed prices." The plaintiffs asserted violations of the 1916 Anti-Dumping
Act,89 charging that the defendants had maintained lower prices for televisions
sold in the United States than for comparable televisions sold in Japan.' The
court held that the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the defendant a right
81. See Douglas v. Urited States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 A. 708 (N.H. 1924).
82. 54 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. 1944).
83. Id. at 944.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See In re Boise Cscade Sees. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (sustaining a motion
to strike the jury demand because the case was too complex for a jury). But see Radial Lip Mach. v.
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. I11. 1977) (overruling motion to strike the demand for
a jury because no case was too complex for a jury).
87. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
88. Id. at 1071.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994).




to a trial by jury where the complexity of the issues in the case would prevent the
jury from performing its task in a rationale manner.9
In spite of the obvious ineffectiveness of juries to decide cases in which they
have no comprehension of the laws involved, there are those that will seemingly
do anything to keep juries empowered. One suggestion is "not to dispense with
juries, but to improve the trial procedures.., such as by the use of summaries,
masters, simplification of issues, trying one issue at a time, and avoiding joinder
in complicated cases.'92
In other words, advocates of keeping the jury system would remedy the
situation by increasing the time and cost of each complex trial by separating cases
and breaking them down into simple terms anybody can follow.93 Of course, this
will undoubtedly lead to increases in appeals based on the judge's faulty
instructions to the juries.' Nonetheless, apparently some believe that time and
money should be sacrificed in order to insure our jury system will remain
"inviolate."
Fortunately, courts have begun to reject pro-jury arguments in cases of
complexity. Perhaps an even greater indication of the declining value placed on
the jury trial can be seen by looking at the case of Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa
Corp.95 The Las Vegas Sun case dealt in part with a claim alleging intra-
enterprise conspiracy violations of antitrust laws.96 Holding that the laws were
technical and complicated, the district judge arrived at his own verdict, refusing
to substitute that of the jury.97
While Re Japanese and Las Vegas Sun are unquestionably positive steps toward
the attainment of justice in proceedings, the fact remains that these positive steps
represent only a very small percentage of cases. Judicial deference in other areas
of the law has not met with nearly as much success as it has in the realm of
complexity.
B. Instructions, Time, and Cost
Theoretically, questions of law are left for the judge, while the jury wrestles
with issues of fact. Therefore, at the end of each proceeding, the judge is left to
explain to the jury the law that is to be applied to the particular circumstances.
It may be helpful to once again analyze the theoretical cross-section to which the
judge must explain the law. These will generally be nonprofessionals; specifical-
91. Id.
92. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 145.
93. But see David M. Nocenti, Complex Jury Trials, Due Process, and the Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Complexity, 18 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 12 (1983) ("If a case is so complicated
that a jury can't understand it with the help of lawyers, expert witnesses, auditors, visual aids, accounts,
summaries and judges, how could a person whose conduct is sought to be controlled by the law at issue
'possibly have known what to do without that help?").
94. See infra note 99.
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ly, they will not be lawyers. From the remaining pool, the people selected are
those who have little to no legal training and quite often minimal education."
Thus, for some, learning the applicable law which could determine a person's fate
will be not only a trying experience, but perhaps a chore beyond their capabilities.
It should come as no surprise, then, that often times cases are appealed solely
or partially on the judge's instructions to the jury.' Thus, time and money is
spent on another entire case simply because the judge, who knows the law, cannot
communicate it properly to the jury.i"
Recently, however, the courts have taken some steps towards reducing costs and
the amount of time spent on superfluous cases. During the 1970s, the United
States Supreme Court reduced the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts in civil
cases and reduced the minimum permissible number of jurors from twelve to
six. 0 ' The Supreme Court reasoned that the reduction in size would have only
a "negligible" impact on the constitutional requirement that juries adequately
represent the community from which they are drawn and that it would not
significantly change jury verdicts." 2
Furthermore, the introduction of small and nonunanimous juries would mean
shorter trials, thereby cutting into backlogs and permitting speedier justice for
everyone." The new juries would also lower costs for taxpayers 4 by reduc-
ing the amounts spent to pay jurors and courtroom attendants."5 Moreover, the
removal of the unanimous verdict requirements would mean fewer hung juries,
many of which lead to second trials, doubling the public's portion of the trial's
cost."
Of course, this action, like all others that question the sanctity of the jury
system, has been met with attack. Opponents claim that the price of these
economies is lesser representation of the community and a greater likelihood of
a wrong verdict because the collective wisdom of the six jurors is less than that
of twelve.0 7 However, this argument is easily refuted in two ways. First, the
requirement of twelve jurors was an arbitrarily chosen number to theoretically
insure a cross-section. As has been discussed extensively, there is no longer a
cross-section from which jurors are chosen. Second, the same argument can be
made that twelve jurors are twice as likely to err in their decision as are six.
Thus, opponents of the recent trend are making baseless arguments.
98. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
99. See Gavin v. O'Leary, 983 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.3d 1559 (10th Cir. 1993).
t01. JOHN GUINTHEF. ET AL., THE JURY IN AMERICA 75 (1988).
102. Lawrence R. Mills, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671 (1973).
103. Edward N. Beiser et al., Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries, in JUDICATURE 426 (1975).
104. See Mills, supr' note 102, at 671.
105. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 75.
106. Id.




The effect of the media has made the selection of jurors an even more difficult
and laborious task. One of many cases which illustrates the problems caused by
the media is United States v. Blanton." In Blanton, the defendants were
convicted of crimes relating to the issuance of retail liquor licenses when one of
the defendants was governor of the state." Due to the substantial media interest
in the case, a series of extra steps had to be taken to insure an impartial jury. The
voir dire examination of the jurors was extended in an effort to measure the prior
media impact of the pretrial publicity on 'the jurors."' Furthermore, the potential
jurors were questioned extensively and were dismissed in mass for even a trace
of prejudice, and there was also a substantial increase in the number of
peremptory challenges."'
The media is able to cause these problems by shielding itself behind a First
Amendment"' guarantee of freedom of speech and press. Thus, it is not likely
that these guarantees will be sacrificed at any time in the near future for judicial
fairness and efficiency. However, in the wake of the high publicity trial of O.J.
Simpson, there may be some changes demanded in response to the media circus
which almost overshadowed the case itself.
D. The Verdict
The most amazing and shocking part of this entire scheme is that juries do not
even have to apply the law. Jurors are not accountable for their decisions; they
deliberate in secret and provide no reasons for their verdicts."' Thus, when all
is said and done, juries can completely disregard the law for whatever reason they
choose. Fortunately, there are two safeguards built into the system to afford some
protection - JNOVs and waivers.
1. Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
The judicial process has built into its system a judge's veto, more commonly
known as a judgement notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)."' This judicial tool
allows the court to enter a judgment contrary to the jury's verdict. Judgment non
obstante veredicto in its broadest sense is a judgment rendered in favor of bne
party notwithstanding the finding of a verdict in favor of the other party."5 In




112. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. See GOBERT, supra note 26, at 6.
114. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (6th ed. 1990).
115. Judgment non obstante veredicto at common law, was "a judgment entered for plaintiff
'notwithstanding the verdict' for defendant; which could be done only, after verdict and before judgment,
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essence, the judge theoretically is empowered to rule in any way, regardless of
the jury's findings. However, there are restraints on this judicial veto. First, the
judge may only grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict subsequent to a
motion for a directed verdict."'
Therefore, the judge is basically powerless to overrule faulty or baseless jury
verdicts unless the motion for a directed verdict requirement is met. This in turn
illuminates the real weakness of this judicial tool. A JNOV is designed to only
be accessed in situations in which the jury obviously makes a wrong decision.
The cases which fall in a grey area, those which should go in one party's favor,
but could conceivably be decided (and are decided) for the other party, are
ignored. Thus, the JNOV rule is basically ineffective in all but a few cases. We
are therefore left with only the waiver as a possible means of avoiding our
constitutional burden to a jury trial in the majority of cases.
2. Waiver
The obvious reply to all the information presented is that if a jury trial is so
awful, why not just waive it? However, this rebuttal misses the mark for two
reasons. First, in some cases, generally those involving felonies, waiver is not
permitted."7 One rationale for denying the power of the accused to waive a trial
by jury is that such a proceeding is against public policy. The state has an interest
in the preservation of the lives and liberties of its citizens, and it would be highly
dangerous to permit a criminal defendant to waive his right to a jury trial."'
Thus, in some cases, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to a jury
trial, but rather a constitutional burden.
Second, a defendant may not wish to waive a jury trial because a jury may
provide his only means of being found not guilty. A lawyer can often times play
on the emotions of jurors. Also, the jurors may render an acquittal for other
reasons. Perhaps they do not understand the law or simply choose not to apply
it. In any case, the jury can be manipulated in the favor of a guilty defendant as
easily as an innocent one. Thus, a defendant with concerns other than "justice"
may welcome a trial by jury.
E. Hypothetical Juiy Processes
The following are two cases, one criminal and one civil, used to illustrate the
potential problems, abuses, and shortcomings inherent within the process of a Irial
by jury. Again, these hypothetical cases are not meant to imply that these judicial
where it appeared that defendant's plea confessed the cause of action and set up matters which, although
veriflea by the verdict, A ere insufficient to constitute a defense or bar to the action." However, due to
either "statutory enactm.nt or because of relaxation of the early common-law rule, the generally
prevailing rule is that either plaintiff or defendant may have ajudgment non obstante veredicto in proper
cases." Id. at 1055-56.
116. See FED. R. CiV. P. 50.
117. See 47 AM. Juji. 2D Jury § 72 (1964).




miscarriages occur during every case, but that these flaws have the potential of
occurring in every case.
1. Criminal Case
Smith, a black man, is charged with murdering Jones, a white man. The
preliminary facts indicate that the two men were engaged in an altercation,
whereby words were exchanged, both men drew knives, and subsequently Jones
was stabbed and died. The jury is to be drawn from a voter registration sheet
located in a predominantly white neighborhood.119 Furthermore, the state laws
prohibit waiver of a jury trial in cases involving felonies."l Given this not too
uncommon fact pattern, a number of possible abuses may occur.
Obviously, Smith has no choice but to have his constitutional burden of a jury
trial exercised for him. In addition, the juror pool is comprised of mainly white
people. Furthermore, the black jurors who are not excused or disqualified could
be subject to removal, either by peremptory challenges or challenges for
cause."' Conceivably, then, Smith could be tried by an all white jury."z Cer-
tainly, this is not what Smith would consider a jury of his peers drawn from a
cross-section of the community. Moreover, considering the racial prejudices that
permeate society, Smith would probably also be more than a little concerned
about his chances for receiving a fair trial.
Once the "impartial" jury has been selected, the trial will proceed to the stage
where the law and facts theoretically converge." The degree of the murder
charge will depend upon aggravating and mitigating factors."l Likely, the issues
of self-defense and/or provocation will be raised." Each of these considerations
will be specifically and explicitly defined for the jury to consider."l Neverthe-
less, once behind closed doors and in deliberation, the jury is free to decide
119. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. The exclusion by the prosecution through exercise of its peremptory challenges of eight black
jurors from one panel is not such a showing of a "systematic use of peremptory challenges" as to deny
the defendant due process of law. Commonwealth v. Banks, 323 A.2d 780, 781 (Pa. 1974). The State's
use of peremptory challenges in the trial of black defendant in which no blacks served on the jury was
not reviewable in the absence of any evidence of a systematic course of excluding blacks from jury
service. State v. Hamilton, 297 So. 2d 419, 420-21 (La. 1974).
122. The trial court did not err in summarily denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the jury
array "for the reason that there are no blacks." State v. Wright, 224 S.E.2d 624, 627 (N.C. 1976).
123. The final verdict is, in theory, supposed to represent the uniting of law and fact. See infra text
accompanying note 140.
124. Aggravating factors, among other things, could be prior history of violent crimes, or
commission of felonies in the past. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE Er AL., CRIMINAL LAW 648 (2d ed. 1986).
125. Self-defense and provocation, if proven, could reduce the offense and accordingly, the possible
punishment. Id.
126. The judge has the unenviable task of attempting to explain to the jury which degree of murder
to apply, depending on the mitigating and aggravating factors they choose to believe. This will often
times provide the defendant's attorney with the vehicle he may need to appeal, based on the judge's
instructions to the jury. See supra note 99.
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however they see fit.v Although the convergence of the law and facts point in
one way, the final verdict may go completely in the other direction."n
Regardless of the decision, the time and money to be consumed by this process
are by no means exhausted. Since the decision of the jury is not appealable,
appeals will be filed questioning whether the judge's instructions of law to the
jury were properly given and received.'29 This is especially true in instances
which involve the death penalty. Research indicates that it is virtually impossible
for a judge to instruct the jury on the offenses and the defendant's deserving of
capital punishment."' This uncertainty will inevitably render the verdict moot
as an appeal will undoubtedly be forthcoming. Finally, we are left to ask, is this
really a system worth keeping?
2. Civil Case
White, a testator, asked Black, an attorney, to draft a will whereby bequests
were to go to certain beneficiaries. Subsequently, White died, and it was
immediately brought to the attention of his relatives that the will was invalid due
to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Brown, a relative, brought a civil action against
Black for malpractice. Furthermore, Brown requested a jury trial, pursuant to the
Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.' 3
Again, assuming a jury trial is allowed, the process of jury selection begins.
Through disqualifications and excusals, the cross-section of the community will
be severely narrowed to a small number of individuals.'3" From there, lawyers
from both sides will attempt to locate the jurors most likely to side with their
client. Thus, the randomness of the selection process, as intended by the Framers,
is effectively eliminated.
Once intact, the jury will listen to excruciatingly dull facts and laws, which
they most likely neither know nor care about. Finally, at the conclusion, the judge
will issue instructions to the jury, at some point explaining that the Rule Against
Perpetuities prohibits the creation of future interests or estates which by
possibility may not become vested within a life or lives in being at the time of
the testator's death or the effective date of the instrument creating the future
interest, and 21 years thereafter," "together with the period of gestation when
the inclusion of the latter is necessary to cover cases of posthumous birth."'35
Who can possibly argue that it is in the best interest of justice that a jury decide
this case? Consider the case of Lucas v. Hamm,'36 in which the California
127. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 99.
130. See LAFAVE, supra note 124, at 168.
131. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 66.
134. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990).
135. Id.
136. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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Supreme Court held that the Rules Against Perpetuities were so confused that not
even an attorney could be expected to understand them. 37 Yet, we live in a
nation that permits such issues to be decided by laymen on a sporadic basis. This
is nothing less than a travesty of justice.
F. Jury Trials - Conclusion
This comment is not meant to suggest that all jury trials will inevitably lead to
a miscarriage of justice. Rather, it is structured to illustrate that the system is
inherently flawed in a number of ways. It is important to remember that all the
jury packing and discriminating done by lawyers and all the misapplication and/or
nonapplication of law done by jurors is done within the parameters of accepted,
legal practice. The system is designed to allow these things to happen. Further-
more, there are a number of casualties within this system: defendants, who are not
allowed to waive a jury trial, in spite of the obvious flaws;138 people awaiting
trial, whose rights to a speedy trial 39 are being sacrificed because of the present
system which takes an exorbitant amount of time; insurance companies, which
must pay off astronomical awards due to our current juror trend of redistributing
the wealth in tort cases; society, which must pay higher premiums to insurance
companies straddled by these decisions; jurors, who are asked to make decisions
they are not qualified to decide or mentally prepared to address, and who face
serious financial loss and the possibility of being sequestered away from
civilization for the duration of the trial. Thus, the question we face today is what
are the conceivable alternatives to the present system?
IV. Alternatives to the Jury System
A. Fix the Present System: Suggested Areas of Change
Many Americans are beginning to realize that the jury system is fundamentally
flawed. However, for most, the thought of abandoning this Constitutional icon is
inconceivable. Therefore, one alternative would be to revamp the present system,
while leaving enough of the old system intact to quell the anxiety of those who
continue to swear by juries.
1. Complexity
The judicial system must cease sacrificing a fair trial in order to preserve the
constitutional guarantee to a jury in cases far beyond the jurors comprehension.
The theory behind jury trials is that the judge decides the law, while the jurors
deal with issues of fact."4 The judge explains the law to the jurors, who apply
it to the given facts and arrive at a verdict. However, the verdict is essentially
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 27-29.
140. See supra note 123.
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meaningless if the jury cannot comprehend the applicable laws. Thus, justice is
not properly served.
Therefore, the i;sue to be addressed is which areas of law are too complex to
entrust to a jury. Likely, the attempt to permit jury trials concerning certain areas
of civil law, while excluding others from the jury, would lead to confusion and
an eventual blurring of any lines drawn. Therefore, it would be both practical and
reasonable to eliminate juries in civil cases altogether. 4'
Not only would such a rule eliminate any confusion that might arise from a less
stringent reduction, it would also serve to cure other inherent ills within the
system. Astronomical jury awards in tort actions would likely cease, bringing a
sense of reality back into a system being played like the lottery by personal injury
attorneys. This would in turn reduce appeals based on the outrageous awards and
may also encourage settlement once the system is no longer as lucrative as it once
was.
Furthermore, cases may actually be decided on the applicable laws, not what
the jury perceives the law to be or on who can better afford to bear the financial
burden.42 Moreover, civil cases are more readily adaptable to nonjury trials in
the public eye. While society may cling to its responsibility of administering
justice to wrongdoers in a criminal case,'43 the same incentive is not found in
civil cases. Therefore, losing a trial by jury is a concession the American people
might be willing to make.
2. Jury Selection
The original intent was for jurors to be randomly selected from within a cross-
section of the community.'" This is no longer the case. With disqualifications,
excusals, and challenges, the jury is whatever the combating lawyers choose it to
be. Often times, the case will be decided on which lawyer did a better job
selecting the jury. This can be cured in a number of ways:
First, eliminate p.remptory challenges. Regardless of the arguments for keeping
these challenges, it is clear that peremptory challenges entirely undermine the
system of arbitrarily selected jurors. While challenges for cause serve to eliminate
jurors perceived to be partial or biased,'45 peremptory challenges simply serve
as a means of rejecting jurors because they do not fit in the model the lawyer is
attempting to build. There is nothing in the Constitution that remotely suggests
141. The notion of one judge presiding solely in civil cases is not unknown to civil law countries,
such as Germany and France, where the practice is widespread. See infra notes 187-89 and
accompanying text.
142. In some instarces, the main consideration in a case for a jury may not be guilt or innocence,
but rather whether insurance is available.
143. See LAFAvE, supra note 124. at 24-25.
144. See supra note 45.
145. A "challenge for cause" is "a request from a party to a judge. that a certain prospective juror
not be allowed to be a member of thejury because of certain specified causes or reasons." BLACK'S LAW




lawyers should have the ability to custom-craft the jury of their wishes; however,
we continue to allow them to do so.
Second, choose from a legitimate cross-section. One method towards effectu-
ating a true cross-section would be to eliminate artificially imposed barriers. In
other words, eliminate restrictions based on gender, race, and religion."4 The
fact that a person may be a Hispanic Catholic does not override the fact that the
person is, first and foremost, a United States citizen who has a duty to serve on
a jury when called. Furthermore, the money saved by eliminating juries in civil
suits could be used to supplement the income of juries in criminal cases. Thus,
people in high and low income brackets will be able to afford to serve on juries,
significantly increasing the communal representation.
3. Juror Accountability
While altering the present method of jury selection may provide a greater
measure of fairness at the outset of a trial, another safeguard is needed at the
conclusion. In no other facet of life with such important ramifications would we
allow decisions to be made with no attached justification or rational. However,
this is what happens when we permit jurors to arrive at verdicts with no expla-
nation for how the verdict was reached.
This is not meant to imply that a grand inquisition in which each juror is
interrogated at length is necessary. Rather, perhaps a simple mandate that the
jurors accompany their verdicts with an explanation is needed. For example, in
the hypothetical case of Smith, the jury could announce its verdict as follows:
"We, the jury, find that the defendant's actions were premeditated and not acted
upon by self-defense. We therefore find the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree." This change would have a couple of soothing effects. First, it should
eliminate any beliefs that the jury acted arbitrarily or with a misunderstanding of
the law. Second, it should reduce appeals based on the judge's instructions, as the
court is expounding on the law as they render their verdict. Furthermore, if the
jury were to misapply the law as they understood it or misunderstand the
instructions, the matter could be dealt with at the current trial, rather than wasting
time and money dealing with the issue in a subsequent hearing.
4. JNOVs
We must ask ourself why the JNOV exists. Presumably, this judicial tool was
developed because someone, somewhere, realized a jury's enormous potential for
completely screwing up. Remember that this safeguard was developed and is used
in instances where a jury's verdict is entirely inconsistent with the facts of the
146. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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case.147 Unfortunately, such a safeguard is not available for wrong jury decisions
which are not so glaring.'"
Now, consider the ramifications of eliminating the motion for a directed verdict
prerequisite before allowing a JNOV. Presumably, within the present system, time
and energy are wasted in writing and ruling on frivolous motions for directed
verdict, filed solely for the purpose of keeping a possible JNOV alive. Eliminat-
ing this prerequisite would save time and money for clients and taxpayers. It
would also serve to expand the areas in which a judge could overturn incorrect
verdicts.
Of course, opponents will complain that to do so would eventually lead to the
complete usurpation of jury power by the judge who might theoretically employ
a JNOV in every case. However, this is not exactly true. A judge's erroneous
decision would likely be subject to appeal. Thus, it would not behoove a trial
judge to arbitrarily overturn the jury's verdict, putting himself under the constant
microscope of an appellate court.
B. Look to Non-Juiy Systems for Alternatives
Civil law countries provide a source which we may look to for certain advances
in our judicial system. From their educational system to their judicial structure,
civil law jurisdictions provide certain aspects which might benefit American
courts. However, of equal importance is the way in which judges are perceived
in their countries in contrast to ours. Before any changes can be made within the
United States, we must first deal with the fear of judicial autonomy that exists at
home in an attempt to achieve the judicial schemes that survive abroad.
1. Fear of Judges
Perhaps the single greatest explanation for why Americans still cling to an
obviously flawed jury system is due to our inherent distrust and lack of faith in
judges. As the argument goes, judges, like jurors, may be biased by experience,
education, or upbringing, but they act alone, without the benefit of eleven others
to serve as a counterweight to their prejudices." 9 Furthermore, if a judge dozes
during a witness' te3timony, there are not eleven others to assure that the witness'
testimony is taken into account." Moreover, judges quickly become habituated
to trials and lack the fresh perspective that jurors can bring to a case." '
147. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
court held that in ruling on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court determines
whether evidence viewei in light most favorable to non-mover constitutes "substantial evidence" in
support of the jury's finding. Id. If so, those findings must support legal conclusions necessarily drawn
by the jury in accord with its instructions enroute to its verdict. Id. For such purposes, "substantial
evidence" is "such relevant evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be accepted by a
reasonable mind as adequate to support the finding under review." Id.
148. Id.
149. See GOBERT, supra note 26, at xi.
150. But see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.




Therefore, critics of judicial decision making rhetorically ask whether it is
irrational to prefer the common sense judgment of lay persons, with their ability
to inject community values into the adjudicational process, to the technical
methods of the legal logician."
However, there is an inherent problem to this argument. It assumes that the
common sense of a judge is' somehow proportionally diminished as his legal
knowledge is increased. This assumption is based not on facts, but rather on ill-
founded, preconceived notions. Also, a judge is just as capable, if not more
so, 53 of instilling the communal values within his judgement. Furthermore, the
judge may perform these acts with a clear knowledge of the laws which govern,
as opposed to the layperson who may either be indifferent or ignorant of the
governing legal principles.
The real problem with judges, the problem which must be overcome if we are
to ever remedy our justice system, is the stigma which has been attached to the
concept of "judges." The American people are still afraid of delegating too much
power to one individual, a fear which has lived at least as long as our Constitu-
tion. 5 A judge with the sole ability to adjudicate disputes is seen as a potential-
ly deadly cancer which may grow and spread throughout the entire system of
justice. Thus, we are willing to live with the widespread ills of a jury system,
which we perceive to be at least nonfatal.
However, an analysis of civil law countries, which primarily employ nonjury
systems, may prove remedial. By examining how judges are educated and viewed
in other parts of the world, perhaps those who live in fear of judicial autonomy
may be somewhat placated. Moreover, such an examination may suggest avenues
of partial, if not complete, structural change within our system.
2. Overcoming Fear by Comparison
a) Education
Judges in civil law countries are viewed, for the most part, with a great deal
more faith that they will adequately perform their functions and with much less
fear that they will somehow abuse their powers in doing so. This is, in part,
attributable to the way in which a judge is simultaneously educated and molded
to perform his function in the civil law community.
In the civil law world, the practicing lawyer or judge is seen as a technician,
as the operator of a machine designed and built by others.'56 Conversely, in the
152. Id.
153. Because of his position and ability to apply certain laws in particular circumstances, the judge
may inject community values without offending the law. However, when juries inject community values,
they usually do so in disregard of the legal guidelines that should govern. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
156. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN Er AL., COMPARATIvE LAW: WETRN EUROPEAN AND LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 410 (1958) [hereinafter MERRYMAN, COMPARATIvE LAw].
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United States, the practicing lawyer or judge is seen as a sort of social engineer,
as a person specially equipped to perceive and to solve social problems.'57 Thus,
the civil law judge, perceived as being more one-dimensional, does not pose the
threat to society that he or she will overstep his or her boundaries. As a tool of
the institution which developed him, the civil law judge will perform tasks
without abusing the judicial position.
Of course, the institution which develops the judges is the civil law educational
system. Legal scholarship is generally pure and abstract in the civil law tradition,
and pays little attention to the operation of legal institutions or to solving concrete
social problems."' Rather, the primary objective is to create a theory or science
of law.'59 In its most extreme form, such scholarship displays a detachment from
society, people, and their problems that astonishes a common law lawyer."w On
the common law side, we view the work of legal scholarship as another facet of
social engineering; 6' our responsibility as scholars is to oversee the operating
legal order, to critique it, and to make suggestions for its improvement. To
common law lawyers, improvement means dealing more adequately with concrete
social problems."
Which approach is the better of the two is open for debate and is of little
consequence for purposes of our discussion. Suffice it to say that the more
mechanical, scientifiz approach of civil law countries would have a couple of
impacts. The perception of judges as scientists would likely be more favored than
the image of judges as political pawns and legal manipulators. Unfortunately, the
same image would serve to enhance the critics present notion that U.S. judges are
stiff and unwilling to inject social and communal standards in their decisions."'
However, more important than the legal theory while in school is the education
that the student of civil law receives after graduation. To Americans, a lawyer is
still a lawyer, no matter what kind of legal work he happens to be doing at the
moment."6 Although many young graduates start out as private attorneys,
government lawyers, or members of the legal staffs of corporations and stay in
those positions for life, it is also common for them to change from one branch of
the profession to another." Things are different in civil law jurisdictions.
There, a choice among a variety of distinct professional careers faces the young
law graduate.6 7 He can embark on a career as a judge, a public prosecutor, a
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and then live with it."6 Although it is theoretically possible to move from one
of these professions to another, such moves are comparatively rare. The initial
choice, once made, tends to be final in the majority of cases."
Upon law school graduation (or following the period of postgraduate training,
where required), the student who desires to become a judge immediately applies
for admission to the judiciary. If selected (often on the basis of a competitive
examination), he enters at the bottom of the profession.' Generally, the student
will find himself or herself assigned to the lowest in the hierarchy of courts in a
remote part of the country. Based on considerations of seniority and demonstrated
merit, the student will gradually rise in the judicial hierarchy to more desirable
and prestigious' judicial positions and eventually retire.' Normally, he or she
will compete for desirable positions only against other members of the judicia-
ry. The highest courts, like the lower courts, are likely to be manned exclu-
sively by those who have risen within the judicial career service. The typical
judge will have no other legal experience outside of his profession as a judge.'
Moreover, his social circles will tend to be composed solely of other judges. He
will see the law exclusively from the judge's point of view. He will be, for all
practical purposes, a specialist. 74
b) Applying the Civil Law Education
Although one can easily find certain faults and aspects of the legal system in
civil law countries that they do not particularly care for, there are undeniable
properties of the civil law system which the United States could adopt to improve
our common law system. The stigma attached to judges could be significantly
reduced if we were to view judges as solely judges, not "lawyers who happen to
be judges." In other words, as painful as it may be to hear, the reputation of
168. Id.
169. Id. at 453.
170. However, there are significant local variations. In Germany, the Referendarzeit intervenes
between the university and the career. In France, since establishment of the Ecole nationale de la
magistrature (National School for Magistrates) in 1958, the person aspiring to become a judge must be
admitted to the School and complete the three-year course. Once a judge, he (or she) will probably
remain a judge until retirement. Id. at 494-95.
171. Id. at 454.
172. Although appointment to positions on the highest court - a supreme court of cassation or its
equivalent - may in theory be open to distinguished practicing lawyers or professors, such appointments
are rare. Id.
173. However, in the emerging European judiciary (as distinguished from the national judicial
systems of individual European countries) there are no career judges.
Judges of the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg, as well as their counterparts, both
in the Commission and the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, are not career
magistrates: their background is not one of an entire life spent in the judiciary: their
appointment to those high adjudicatory bodies is not based on seniority in the judicial
service; their personalities are far from bureaucratic and anonymous.
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lawyers in America is not at an all-time high. Thus, it would make sense to
disassociate the concept of judges with the notion of lawyers as much as possible.
By viewing the two as separate entities, the hostilities of those who view lawyers
and judges as one in the same may be somewhat assuaged.
Another civil law characteristic worthy of adoption is the means by which civil
law judges scale the ranks. In its purest sense, it is a system based on merit and
"what you know," not "who you know." This could be important for a couple of
reasons. First, more qualified, well-trained individuals will compete for judicial
appointments. Thus, judges will not only work for promotion, they will not
become the sleeping-on-the-job burnouts as critics claim.73 Secondly, promotion
based on merit and seniority, rather than election, will help to reduce the fear of
decisions based purely on political grounds.'76
This should in turn foster respect from people who also may start to view
judges differently. Rather than being seen solely as political puppets,
powermongers, or a3 incompetent but well connected, judges will be looked upon
as competent individuals who have worked hard to achieve their status and are
capable in their position. In all walks of life, people admire those who are hard
working, while loathing those who are handed everything. The judicial infrastruc-
ture is no different. With this new perception would come a marked increase in
the faith of the people and a decrease in their fear of judicial decision making.
3. Restructuring the Courts
Assuming the stigma and fear attached to judges is a negotiable hurdle, the next
issue becomes how to restructure the court systems in an attempt to allocate more
power to the judge and less to the juries. An examination of civil law jurisdic-
tions reveals two possible alternatives. First, the court could be comprised of a
mix of judge(s) and laypersons, who deliberate together to decide the defendant's
fate. Second, the court could be made up solely of judges, with no jury as we
know it. Both of these scenarios have their advantages and disadvantages.
Ultimately though, the final question will be how effective these systems are in
their entirety, compared to our present day jury system.
a) The Civil Law Tradition
The modern civil law is the product of three great legal systems: the law
developed by the juriconsults of Rome from the foundation of the city (tradition-
ally given as 753 13.c.) until the codification by the Emperor Justinian in A.D.
533; the folk laws of Germanic origin, many of which were written down
from the fifth century A.D.; 7 8 and the canon law, the law of the Church, which
175. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
176. There exists a justifiable fear that certain judges are inclined to arrive at judgements based on
political pressures, to either keep their position or elevate themselves to a higher one.
177. See MERRYMP.N, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 156, at 77; see also K.W. RYAN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAw 1-9, 12-15 (1962).




was in many respects based on the Roman law, but which nevertheless constituted
a distinct system."
The ordinary courts in a typical civil law country are essentially limited to
criminal prosecutions and cases involving matters of private law, such as
contracts, torts, property rights, matrimonial disputes, and controversies over
decedents' estates. 80 However, as shall be illustrated, there are important
differences in the overall judicial scheme from one civil law country to the
next.'
b) Mixing Judge and Jury - France
Perhaps the civil law country whose judicial structure may be most adaptable
to the United States is that of France. Much like our own constitution, France's
Constitution of the Fifth Republic" was based on the principle of separation of
powers. 8 ' The judiciary does not have the prestige in France that it has in
England. Nor does it have or aspire to the functions and responsibilities of judges
in the United States. l" Moreover, in the private and criminal law areas, the
courts' powers are restricted by the codification,"n which at least theoretically
179. Id.
180. RUDOLPH SCHLESINGER Er AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 371 (5th ed. 1988).
181. A discussion of every civil law country is naturally outside the parameters of this Comment.
Accordingly, the discussion will be limited to the civil law jurisdictions of France, Germany, Italy, and
Latin America.
182. The First Republic existed from 1792 to 1804. The Second continued from 1848 until 1852.
The Third, established after the war of 1870, lasted until 1940. The Fourth, began after the liberation
of France in 1944 and survived until 1958. The Fifth was set up following the events of May and June
1958. MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 156, at 257.
183. It should be noted that as between the U.S. and France, the concept of "separation of powers"
is viewed quite differently. In the latter, the historical roots of separation of power lie in the goal of
preventing judicial intrusion into the other branches. See generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN ET AL., THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 15 (2d ed. 1985). Italy similarly developed their judiciary with the concept of
separation of powers in mind. The Italian philosophy can be summed up as follows: Judicial decisions
as a source of law are rejected based on Italy's strong emphasis on a strict separation of powers. While
making the law is one thing, interpreting and applying the laws is very much another. Therefore, in
deciding the case, the judges responsibility is merely to interpret and apply the law, not create it. The
decision is binding on the parties, but does not bind others. Thus, stare decisis is rejected. Otherwise
judges would become legislators, and the dogma of shared separation of legislative and judicial power
would be violated. See id. at 557; see also French Civil Code, C. CiV. art. V (requiring courts to decide
only the actual case before them and enjoins them from rendering decisions laying down general
principles); SCHLESINGER, supra note 180, at 266.
184. For comparative purposes, examine the systems of Latin America. With the exception of Cuba,
all Latin American countries have made it a principle to ensure independence of the courts through a
system of the separation of powers. Anglo-Saxon influence (English rather than North American) is
shown in the selection of judges under a procedure generally regarded as promoting their independence.
There is no watertight division between careers on the bench and the bar, since all over Latin America
judges and public prosecutors are recruited among lawyers who have practiced for a long time. They
may be appointed directly to the highest judicial posts. MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note
156, at 340.
185. "Codification" simply means that judges look to 'codes' rather than to prior case law and
precedent as a primary source for resolving disputes. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 258 (6th ed. 1990).
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solves all problems.' However, the infrastructure provides us with a model of
a system which operates around the premise of judge and layperson interacting
to resolve disputes.
Within the French courts of general jurisdiction, only the court of minor
jurisdiction and the police court in the criminal areas are composed of a single
judge.' Among th- courts of exceptional jurisdiction, the landlord-tenant
courts, the referee's court (jurisdiction des referes), and the court of the president
of the court of major jurisdiction (jurisdiction du president du tribunal de grande
instance) are single-judge tribunals."S In all other cases, the principle of judicial
collegiality prevails. In most courts, three judges collaborate in a decision, and
in the Court of Cassation the minimum number is seven.'
For criminal cases, different courts have jurisdiction depending on how the'
offense alleged, judged by the penalty involved, is classified. There are three
classifications of offenses under the French system: a major offense (crime); "
an intermediate offense punishable by brief imprisonment or fine (delit); 9' or
a minor offense (contravention)."'' Major offenses are judged, in first and last
instance, by the court of assize (Cour d'assises), a court composed of three
magistrates and nine jurors who are selected randomly for each session of the
court of assize from a previously established list.'"
An application of the French system to the two hypothetical cases discussed
earlier yields interesting results. To begin, let us consider Brown's civil action
against Black for mEolpractice. Using the French method, this case would most
likely fall under the jurisdiction of a single judge." The immediate benefits of
this style of adjudication are numerous.
First, the entire process of juror selection is eliminated. Time, energy, and
money would all be saved before the trial had even begun. Second, once the trial
begins, a judge with experience and knowledge of the subject matter will
theoretically preside over the case. Finally, in all civil law nations judges are
required to base their decisions on the law."' The judicial function involves the
correct interpretation and application of the law."' Thus, the case will be
186. MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 156, at 262.
187. Id. at 272.
188. Id.
189. Since 1941 the judges and jurors have joined together to decide both on the question of guilt
and on the penalty. Id.
190. Id. at 270.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Intermediate offenses are judged, in the first instance, by the correctional court (tribunal
correctionnel), the criminal law equivalent of the court of major jurisdiction. Appeals, if any, go to the
correctional appeals chamber (Chambre des appels correctionnels) of the court of appeals. Minor
offenses are handled by the police court (tribunal de police) which corresponds to the court of minor
jurisdiction. Appeals, if any, go to the court of appeals. Id.
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.





decided based on the law, not on what a bewildered set of jurors perceives the
law to be.
The criminal case against Smith would be dealt with in France by the court of
assize." Thus, three magistrates and nine jurors would decide the case."'
Unfortunately, following current thinking on this issue, such a system would
likely be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, all the aforementioned
problems with jurors and their selection would still exist. Second, critics of this
idea will point out that the fact that we are too paranoid to allow lawyers to act
as jurors should be a great enough sign that the idea of judges deliberating would
also meet with hostility. The American people's first reaction would be that of
fear that the judges will use their persuasive powers to manipulate the decisions
of the lay persons. Thus, critics will conclude although such a scheme is perfectly
acceptable in a country like France, it would not gain favor in the United States.
This difference may once again be attributable to the perception of the judge.
In France, the judge is generally considered to be harmless. The French judicial
system attracts some relatively unambitious men who prefer the security of a
modest but sure salary to the hazards of battle, the risks of business life, or the
uncertainties of competition.'" The contrast with the United States is fundamen-
tal and important. In the United States, a judicial appointment is regarded as a
crowning achievement that comes relatively late in life after a successful legal
career in practice or government service. A judicial appointment is a form of
recognition that brings respect and prestige. However, with respect and prestige
comes the people's need to harness the increasing power of the judiciary and to
mitigate the threat of judicial autonomy.2
In short, although they perform many similar functions, judges in France and
the United States occupy entirely different positions in their respective cul-
tures. " ' The judiciary stands very high in our hierarchy of legal professions, but
relatively low in theirs."° Thus, the gap between the judge and lay person is
much smaller in France, and, accordingly, so is the potential for the juror to be
inevitably swayed by the views of the judge during deliberation.
c) An Increase in Judicial Power - Germany
Judges are more powerful under the German system than under the French
system. In Germany, the decision of legal disputes is entrusted exclusively to
judges; the courts have a monopoly on the judicial function. The judges are
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 156, at 495.
200. Id.
201. The classical discussion of the problem of a career judiciary, stressing the inconsistency
between constitutional "independence" and administrative dependence on a ministerial bureaucracy, is
to be found in the slim but significant book, PIERO CALAMANDREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 35-44
(1956).
202. MERRYMAN, COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 156, at 496.
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independent and subject only to the law.2" In addition, in order to protect the
judge from indirect encroachment by means of administrative measures, he is
granted a guaranty of'personal independence." °
Germany adheres to the classical civil law system of judicial organization. The
single judge inferior court is called Amtsgericht, while the first-instance court of
general jurisdiction, which normally sits in three judge panels, is named
Landgericht. Germany also places a high value on specialized judicial expertise
for certain areas." 5 T.hus, Germany may be viewed as a country which affords
its justices a great deal of autonomy to perform the work for which they have
been educated.
In criminal cases, the bench normally will be comprised of one or three
professional judges and a number of lay assessors. Under this system, not unlike
the French system, the professional judges and the lay assessors form the court
together, which as a single body passes on issues of law as well as fact and
determines both guilt and sentencing."
Applying the German method to the two hypothetical cases discussed earlier
would most likely yield the same results as did the French method, with one
important exception. In the civil case, a single judge would likely preside,"°
removing the need for a greatly flawed process of juror selection. Moreover, the
case would be decided on both fact and law,"~ as a specialized judge would
apply the latter to the former. As for the criminal case, the matter would once
again be settled by a panel composed of professional judges and laypersons
working in conjunction with one another to arrive at a verdict."°
However, the important exception is recognized in an analysis of the power and
perception accorded to the judges in Germany. Whereas in France, critics could
argue that the mixed system worked solely because the French judges did not
present a threat of overpowering the layperson, such an argument is not possible
in this case. German judges are afforded a great deal of power, perhaps even
more so than are American judges. Therefore, it follows that if such a system is
possible within the German structure, it may also achieve success within the
courts of the United States.
In essence, the German system is ongoing proof that a mix of judge and
layperson in adjudicating disputes is not only possible, but can work in a
beneficial manner. While such a scheme would still allow for the abusive process
203. Id.
204. Id. at 278.
205. Altogether, Germany has four separate judicial hierarchies: ordinary courts, labor courts, tax
courts, and administrativ courts. Each of these hierarchies includes tribunals of first instance,
intermediate appellate courts and a court of last resort. In addition, there is a Federal Constitutional
Court. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 180, at 499. For a description of the entire system, see Hans G.
Rupp, Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 AM. J. CoMP. L. 29 (1960).
206. SCHLESINGER, supra note 180, at 477.
207. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.




of jury selection, it could also provide a safeguard against arbitrary decisions
which do not adhere to the applicable governing laws. In its purest sense, the
German system could represent the matrimony of law and fact in deliberation.
4. Eliminate Juries Altogether
The final alternative to our present system of dispute resolution is to abolish
juries altogether, leaving a judge or a series of judges to resolve all matters. This
idea has roots both in the United States and abroad. As was previously
mentioned, courts in France and Germany will often times adjudicate claims
without juries. In the United States, we generally delegate minute claims to the
judge to resolve °
The most obvious benefit would be the elimination of all the problems and
abuses related to the selection and use of the jury system. Moreover, significant
time and money would be saved, thus preserving another aspect of the Constitu-
tion which has all but been forgotten - the right to a speedy trial. Furthermore,
such an abolition would serve to relieve common people of a duty they most
likely view as an intrusion, and one which most are ill-equipped to handle.
The elimination of the jury system would unquestionably put a large amount
of power into the hands of the judge (or judges). However, as it presently stands,
the name judge is a misnomer, as the person wearing the robe generally does
nothing of the sort. By allowing the judge the ability to adjudicate the dispute,
rather than simply serve as an orchestrator of the process, the system will permit
the judge to apply the law to the facts, something juries don't always do, to arrive
at a decision.
The power does not necessarily have to be put exclusively in the hands of one
person. A series of judges may well be used. Again, the money saved on the
elimination of juries and their selection could be used the supplement the judges'
income. Furthermore, the time saved should also allow for lower costs of
bringing suit.
Ideally, three judges could be used in criminal cases to insure that the proper
law is applied, while simultaneously checking any prejudices or outside influences
which may be present on behalf of one of the judges. The effectiveness of this
scheme would also be furthered by abrogating the necessity of a unanimous
decision. By allowing a simple majority, a judge's prejudice may be overcome by
the other two judges, and the case may be decided one way or the other without
a hung trial.
V. Conclusion
Within the current jury system, there are several problems which demand
immediate attention. The jury system is fraught with faults and potential abuses
which must be remedied if ours is to be considered a system of justice. There are
210. For example, traffic violations are presided over by a single judge in most cases.
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a number of means whereby the system can be significantly improved, if not
completely cured.
Perhaps the simplest step to take would be to effectuate changes within the
current system; however, it could be argued quite effectively that the present
system is beyond hope and a new one is needed. In that case, there are two
options. The first is to mix judge and jury. While this alternative would
theoretically blend law with fact, the time, money, and abuses of jury selection
will still survive. The second and more radical choice would be to eliminate
juries altogether. Adthough this option could present the best opportunity for
significant improvement, it has little chance for adoption. The fear of a great deal
of power in the hands of a few, along with the present stigma against all related
to the legal profession, would likely present an insurmountable hurdle.
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